Matt Yglesias has an amazing ability to summarize complicated issues simply. Last week, he wrote, All Politics Is Identity Politics. He noted that people generally define “identity politics” as those of race or gender — and increasingly sexual orientation. And he summed up his point with two simple but powerful sentences, “The implication of this usage is that somehow an identity is something only women or African-Americans or perhaps LGBT people have. White men just have ideas about politics that spring from a realm of pure reason, with concerns that are by definition universal.” Yeah, that’s about right.

This is the essence of “white male privilege” — at least as far as I’m concerned. There are other elements to it of course: having an easier time finding a job and not having police think the default way to deal with you is to kill you. But the fundamental issue is the invisibility of whiteness and maleness. If you are a white male, you are an individual in our society. If you are a woman or a person of color, you are seen through the prism of your membership in a particular group. And that’s what’s so great about Yglesias’ observation. The “identity” is not about the individual; it is about the label that the society broadly places on the individual.

Yglesias goes on to highlight complaints about Bill de Blasio focusing on racism in New York City policing. He noted that not focusing on this is as much of a choice as focusing on it. But we see this kind of thing all the time. Allowing corporations to continue to illegally bust unions is considered somehow morally neutral in a way that doing something about this illegal activity (which the federal government has ignored for four decades now) means siding with one side. Implicit siding with the corporations is oddly considered not taking a stand.

Here is where it is really helpful to be identity invisible. Let’s suppose that it is the 1970s and you get cheaper housing because you aren’t black. You have the luxury of thinking the status quo is “natural.” You aren’t getting a lower interest rate on your mortgage; you are getting the just interest rate. And those African Americans are asking for laws that apply specifically to them — because of their identity. That’s so not you because you aren’t asking for anything because of your identity. Because you are already getting it by default.

Yglesias summed up the situation perfectly:

Ultimately, this is all about who sets the parameters of the debate. This is why I have little tolerance for all the whining about the “new political correctness” and things like that. At core, it is all about powerful people claiming that their their power is being challenged. The great thing about privilege is not having to ask for special rights. But that doesn’t mean the privileged don’t still ask for them.

The pollster J Ann Selzer wrote a very interesting article over at The Des Moines Register, Selzer Score Helps Bring Order to GOP Herd. It tries to get a handle on what will happen in the Iowa caucus. The issue is that caucuses work in a more “hands on” way and so there is jockeying for support during the caucus. The Democratic process is even more interesting in that only candidates who get at least 15% of any given caucus’ vote are allowed; so if someone votes for, say, Lincoln Chafee and less than 15% of the people there vote for him, they will have to switch to their second favorite candidate. The Republican caucus is more straightforward, but the same kind of thing will happen. And over time, this is what happens in the overall election as the weaker candidates drop out.

So Selzer put together a system where she looks at voters secondary choices. She uses three components. First, she gives double weight to people’s first choice. Second, she gives regular weight to people’s second choice. And third, she gives half weight to whether they would ever consider voting for the candidate. It’s a clever scheme. But I don’t see any reason to believe it. The results say far more about the model than about reality. Still, there is some explanatory value in the exercise.

What I think is most interesting are just the numbers of people who would consider even voting for different candidates. That to me seems like a reasonable way of looking at the long term potential of each. Obviously, these opinions can change. But it is hard to take serious a candidate that 58% say they would never vote for. I’ve taken Selzer’s data and put it together in the following chart:

Let’s start by discussing the second column: Consider. This is the percentage of people who say they would consider voting for the candidate. Donald Trump is a great example. He clearly is a non-starter as a viable candidate, but he still has 4% of the vote in terms of first choices. As Selzer noted: “enough to rank him in the top 10.” And that means it is enough to put him in the first presidential debate. Yet only 34% of those polled say they would ever vote for him. Similarly, Jeb Bush just makes it into the top ten by this accounting.

The third column provides an important caveat. It is the total “Consider” column plus the number of people who said they didn’t know. This provides some insight into people who might get some traction as they make their way through the campaign: Bobby Jindal, Carly Fiorina, and John Kasich. But that speaks really poorly of Jeb Bush. By this accounting, he comes in 12th place — only a bit ahead of George Pataki! There are also people like Ben Carson who lots of Republicans think they know because he’s gotten so much attention on Fox News. But I think in an actual election, he’s going to show himself to be the political amateur that he is, and his numbers will come down accordingly.

The Republican Party would be smart to look at something like this for their debates. It has the advantage of weeding out two of the most embarrassing candidates: Donald Trump and Chris Christie. Just the same, there is plenty of crazy getting high scores: Carson, Huckabee, Cruz. I don’t understand why Republicans think so lowly of Trump (42%) and so highly of Cruz (80%). But given that there isn’t much in terms of ideological difference between “establishment” candidate Scott Walker and “crazy” candidate Ben Carson, maybe there isn’t anything to understand. Maybe it’s just random.

For years I’ve been arguing that Greece should exit the Euro. Partly, this is axiomatic for me. A shared currency was always a bad idea. And the way it has played out is that Germany — as the dominant economy on the Euro — has almost total power. And Germany — as it has for the last hundred years and more — has abused that power. It’s nothing personal against the Germans. Truthfully, I just assume that the Germans will act like Americans and I’m never disappointed — which is to say that I am always disappointed but never surprised.

So I have never thought that Greece would get a fair deal. It’s really simple: the Greek government screwed up. Unlike the other European countries that got into trouble, it was culpable. And given that, Germany and the other countries were going to have to show Greece mercy. Fat chance with that. So I always thought that it was a matter of Greece exiting the Euro early or exiting it late. And once you conclude that, it really doesn’t make much sense to torture yourself for years while putting off the inevitable. If Greece had exited in 2010, it would have taken a year or two to get back on its feet. If it does it now, it will take a year or two to get back on its feet.

Matt Yglesias, surprisingly, thinks that Greece doesn’t have much bargaining power right now, Greece Is in Crisis (Again), and Here’s What You Need to Know. He argued that if Greece exits the Euro, it would actually hurt the moderate parties in the rest of Europe. But why does that matter to Greece? This should be the great concern for the European establishment. If Greece exits the Euro and manages to do well within a couple of years, this will embolden more extreme parties in other countries. Many of those parties are not too nice. That provides a great deal of incentive to the rest of Europe, if only it were worried about, you know, World War III as much as it was worried about bankers losing a bit of money.

Yglesias has an answer to my concern, by responding to — of all people — Josh Barro. Barro has been saying the same things I have, “Doesn’t Greece need to leave the Euro for the same reason everyone needed to leave the gold standard in the 1930s?” Yes, it does! It needs to lower the value of its currency. And, “I get it: transitioning off the Euro would be very very painful. But not transitioning off also looks very very painful!” But Yglesias’ response to this again makes me scratch my head. He puts forth the European project as one to minimize conflict — to avoid World War III, if you like. And he noted Greece had previously been mired in civil war. But again I say: isn’t this a bigger issue to Europe than to Greece? Isn’t this the reason that the Germany and the rest should really want to make a deal with Greece?

Yglesias does mention an idea for keeping Greece in the EU that was proposed by Wolfgang Münchau. It sounds reasonable. But then most of what Greece has proposed has sounded reasonable. It doesn’t seem to me that it has been Greece that has stood in the way of a deal. If Münchau’s idea was reasonable, why didn’t the more experienced bureaucrats of the EU push it? I think the reason is clear enough. The European Union Commission is really not interested in doing what is best for the people of the EU. They are focused on the interests of the power elite. And like such people everywhere, they have pushed their financial interests to the point where they may end up hurting themselves.